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How does product market structure
inuence nancial structure and bankruptcy
risk?
Abstract
The decision-making process is crucial to the success or failure of an organization. We
can analyze nancial decisions (particularly decisions regarding capital structure) and / or
operational decisions (quantities and prices to be charged). These decisions are inuenced
by the dynamic economic and competitive environment in which rms live.
The dissertation aims, using a game theoretical framework, to examine how market
structure inuences nancial and product market decisions and consequently the bank-
ruptcy risk .It analyzes the impact of changes at the level of demand uncertainty, in the
degree of product di¤erentiation and the asymmetry in marginal production costs on the
risk of bankruptcy. The analysis is performed assuming a duopoly market where there is
uncertainty in demand and where rms compete in quantities.
Keywords:Product Market, Financial Structure, Bankruptcy Risk
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Como é que a estrutura de mercado
inuencia a estrutura de capital e o risco de
falência?
Resumo
O processo de tomada de decisão é crucial para o sucesso ou insucesso de uma organi-
zação. Pode-se falar em decisões nanceiras (particularmente decisões quanto à estrutura
de capital) e/ou em decisões operacionais (quantidades e preços ótimos a praticar). Estas
decisões são inuenciadas pelo contexto económico e concorrencial dinâmico em que as
empresas vivem.
Esta dissertação pretende, utilizando o enquadramento da teoria dos jogos, analisar
como é que a estrutura de mercado inuencia as decisões nanceiras e do mercado do
produto e consequentemente o risco de falência. É analisado o impacto de mudanças no
nível de incerteza na procura, no grau de diferenciação do produto e na assimetria nos
custos de produção sobre o risco de falência. A análise será feita assumindo um mercado
duopólio onde existe incerteza na procura e onde as empresas competem em quantidades.
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The decision-making process is crucial to the success or failure of an organization. We
can analyze nancial decisions (particularly decisions regarding capital structure) and / or
operational decisions (quantities and prices to be charged). These decisions are inuenced
by the dynamic economic and competitive environment where rms live. Wrong nancial
and operational decisions can lead the rm into a deteriorating nancial situation and
may even lead to bankruptcy.
Decisions on the capital structure and output market decisions inuence the success
or failure of an organization. Hence the way in which these type of decisions a¤ect the
bankruptcy probability is an important topic to be analyzed. The link between the capital
structure decision and product market decisions has been addressed, both in the corporate
nance literature and in the industrial organization literature. However the analysis of
the inuence of these two types of decisions on the probability of bankruptcy is almost
nonexistent. In fact, the bankruptcy probability has been addressed separately without
considering these strategic decisions. Considering the negative social and economic im-
pacts of bankruptcy, many researchers have searched for the best model to predict and
explain the risk of bankruptcy but there is a lack of theoretical models explaining the
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relationship between capital structure, output market competition and bankruptcy.
The study of how market structure inuences nancial decisions and output market
decisions and their impact on the bankruptcy probability is a topic of high relevance for at
least two reasons: the denition of an optimal capital structure that maximizes the value
of a company, taking into account the possibility of default or bankruptcy resulting from
various factors (uncertainty in demand, the degree of product di¤erentiation or the level
of asymmetry in marginal production costs) inherent in a competitive economy, allows
for a better prediction of nancially di¢cult situations, reducing the number of bank-
ruptcies,which results not only in the decrease of unemployment, but also in a substantial
decrease in the direct and indirect costs incurred by the rm; the awareness of this reality
in advance allows businesses to rstly take preventive actions, and establish long-term
relationships with other stakeholders, with less fear of contract default, increasing the
viability of sustainable business.
We can conclude that the denition of a capital structure and a productive structure
(quantity produced) that maximize the expected value of the rm (value to shareholders
and debt holders) incorporating the probability of nancial distress or even bankruptcy,
presents an important contribution. The consideration of a model where there is strate-
gic interaction among agents and where the impact of changes in the parameters are
investigated, provides a quite realistic and complete scenario.
1.2 Problem and purposes
This study aims to examine analytically and numerically, how the market structure in-
uences nancial decisions and decisions in the product market (the optimal amount to
produce) and, consequently, the bankruptcy risk and other important variables for the
rm (interest rate, expected equity value, expected debt value and welfare). Our objective
is to analyze the impact of changes in the level of uncertainty in demand, the degree of
product di¤erentiation and the asymmetry in marginal production costs on the risk of
bankruptcy. We aim to analyze if an increase in the uncertainty and in the degree of
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product di¤erentiation leads to an increase in debt and in the quantity to be produced;
to understand if an increase in the uncertainty leads to an increase on the bankruptcy
probability; to identify if an increase in the degree of product di¤erentiation leads to an
increase on the bankruptcy probability; to analyze if an unilateral increase in the marginal
cost of production leads to an increase on the bankruptcy probability in both rms (e¢-
cient and ine¢cient rm), and nally to understand the impact of increased uncertainty
in demand, the degree of product di¤erentiation and the degree of asymmetry on interest
rate, expected equity value, expected debt value and welfare.
1.3 Methodology
The work aims to do an analytical resolution of a game theory model: a duopoly model
(there are only two rms in the market) where there is uncertainty in demand. Firms
decisions are made with the objective of maximizing their expected value (value for share-
holders and creditors). The model incorporates two decisions stages (in the rst stage
rms decide on the nancial structure and in the second stage rms decide how much to
produce, that is, we assume Cournot competition).
As previously mentioned, the study aims to analyze a problem with strategic inter-
action in which the objective function is the maximization of the rm value. The model
has two stages and it will be solved by backwards induction, i.e., rst we will determine
the equilibrium quantities, quantities that maximize shareholder value. After calculating
the equilibrium quantity, we will determine the corresponding optimal nancial structure.
Part of the model will be deduced analytically, but due to its complexity and to infer the
sensitivity to the parameters, we have to resort to a numerical analysis (we use program
GAUSS to do this numerical analysis).
The study aims to examine, analytically and numerically, how the market structure
inuences nancial decisions and output market decisions. First the model will be de-
ducted analytically, particularly the rst order conditions in the second stage of the game
(conditions that maximize the expected value of the rm to shareholders). The rest of
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the model is solved numerically. We determine numerically the equilibrium quantities
and later (backward induction) it, we determine the equilibrium debt levels and the equi-
librium bankruptcy probabilities. Through numerical analysis it is possible to study the
impact of changes on demand uncertainty, the degree of di¤erentiation between products
and the marginal costs asymmetry on the equilibrium output, the equilibrium debt levels
and the equilibrium probability of bankruptcy.
1.4 Structure of dissertation
In order to be able to analyze how the market structure inuences nancial decisions and
decisions in the product market and consequently the bankruptcy risk, this dissertation
is organized as follows.
After this brief introductory chapter, Chapter 2 reviews the literature that relates
capital structure and output market competition. We also present the main developments
in the bankruptcy probability literature. We end this chapter with the presentation of
studies that relate the three areas: studies that relate capital structure, output market
and bankruptcy probability.
Chapter 3 presents the research methodology. Specically, we present the model and
its resolution. Firstly we present the resolution of the second stage of the game and then,
through the backwards induction process, we present the solution of the rst stage.
Chapter 4 is devoted to expose the numerical results and their subsequent analysis.
We begin to present the results in the symmetric case, i.e. when the rms have the same
marginal production cost, and then we present the asymmetric case, assuming that one
rm is more e¢cient than the other.
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation summarizing the main results of this work, point-





Bankruptcies have a social and economic impact which explains why many researchers
are interested in nding the best form to predict the bankruptcy risk. Decisions regarding
capital structure and output market inuence the success or failure of a rm, so this kind
of decision will inuence the probability of bankruptcy.
According to Craven and Islam (2013) the choice of capital structure is, therefore,
important for inuencing the value of the rm and Wanzeried (2003) states that ...the
choice of a rms capital structure is in fact closely related to its output market deci-
sions...the choice of rms capital structure depends on specic output market character-
istics such as substitutability between di¤erent varieties and volatility in demand. The
decision on the capital structure does not a¤ect only shareholders and creditors, but it
also a¤ects non-nancial stakeholders such as customers, suppliers and employees. This
was addressed in the work of Titman (1984), Cornell and Shapiro (1987) and Menendez
(2002).
This chapter aims to present the main references regarding the link between nancing
and output market decisions and their relationship with the bankruptcy probability. The
analysis is divided into three parts: the rst part reviews the existing studies that relate
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the decisions on capital structure and market output; the aim of the second part is to
present the main references regarding to the probability of bankruptcy and, nally, in the
third part we present the main studies that relate the two previous points, i.e., linking
nancing and output market decisions with the bankruptcy probability.
2.2 Studies relating capital structure and output mar-
ket
The link between nancing and output market decisions began to emerge with the pio-
neering work of Modigliani and Miller (1958). The authors argue (taking into account
their propositions I and II, where they consider an economy without taxes) that in a
perfect capital market, the capital structure is irrelevant in determining the rm value,
the important thing is the value created by the assets. In their framework there is no
relationship between nancial structure and output market decisions. In 1963 Modigliani
and Miller, restated the propositions I and II considering an economy with taxes, they
claim that a rm reaches its maximum value when fully indebted as it is when it gets the
maximum tax benet. Theories of capital structure that followed (the trade-o¤ theory
and the pecking order theory) support the existence of an optimal capital structure, but
they do not incorporate in their analysis the interdependence of nancing decisions and
output market decisions. According to Lee (2000, 2) one of the di¢culties with current
capital structure theories is that they do not consider the linkage between the output mar-
ket (or input market) and a rms nancial policy. It is not di¢cult to conceive the fact
that a rms nancial policy interacts with the product market, where the rm eventually
generates cash ow. Moreover, it can be argued that a rms ultimate survival depends
on how well it competes in the product market.
The existence of a link between the nancial structure and output market decisions has
been highlighted both on the Corporate Finance literature and the Industrial Organization
literature and begins to emerge in the 80s. Riordan (2003) presents a critical survey that
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summarizes the existing literature on the interaction between capital structure and output
market. The author argues that the capital market restrictions depend on the output
market competition.
According to the literature, the relationship between capital structure and product
market decisions can be divided into two types of models: the ones that emphasize the
role of limited liability and the ones which are based on predatory behavior. In the rst
type of models, an increase in debt leads to a more aggressive behavior of the rms in the
output market, i.e. when rms have limited liability 1 they tend to produce more. The
models of predatory behavior defend the opposite, i.e. most indebted rms tend to adopt
a more conservative approach, while rms without nancial constraints tend to be more
aggressive.
In the models that emphasize the role of limited liability, Brander and Lewis (1986)
were the rst to examine the relationship between nancial decisions and output market
competition. They consider a two stage Cournot duopoly model2 with an uncertain
environment. In the rst stage, each rm decides the capital structure. In the second
stage, taking into account their previously chosen nancial structure, rms take their
decisions on the output market. The model focuses on the e¤ects of the limited liability
in debt nancing. Brander and Lewis (1986) ignore the physical investment decision. They
assume that the investment decision is taken before the capital structure decision. If this
assumption was not made, the debt-equity mix choice would inuence the investment
which would have further e¤ects on the output market.3 As pointed out by Brander
and Lewis (1986) one possible interpretation of the capital structure choice is that the
rm is initially equity nanced, when the loan is taken the borrowed money is fully
1According to the Portal da Empresa, rms with limited liability: there is a separation be-
tween the personal assets of the entrepreneur and the assets allocated to the rm. The en-
trepreneurs own assets are not allocated to the operation of economic activity; the debts re-
sulting from the economic activity respond only to the rms assets. Translation of the site
http://www.portaldaempresa.pt/CVE/pt/Criacao/escolherformajuridica/estabelecimentoindividual/
2There are two classical models in oligopoly theory: Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883). In the rst
model, the rms set quantities. In the last model, prices are the strategic variables. In both models the
equilibrium concept used is the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (1950).
3This happens in Clayton (2009) where the investment is made to reduce the marginal cost of pro-
duction.
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distributed among shareholders. The authors conclude that debt tends to encourage a
more aggressive behavior (to produce more) in the output market, and the competitor
tends to produce less. Thus, rms have an incentive to use their nancial structure for
strategic purposes. Maksimovic (1988) conrms the ndings of Brander and Lewis (1986)
regarding the aggressiveness of indebted rms in the output market; this is due to the
existence of limited liability, however the author considered a model with multiple periods
of interaction and shows that debt is a barrier for rms to be able to maintain collusion
outcomes.
However previous work does not consider the denition of the nancial contract as a
strategic variable, which that changes the results. Grimaud (2000) follows the formaliza-
tion of Brander and Lewis (1986), but incorporates the denition of the nancial contract
as a strategic variable. According to the author, the existence of asymmetric information,
between borrowers and lenders, has an important role in the relationship between nan-
cial decisions and the output market decisions. As reported by the author, the increase in
debt leads to an aggressive behavior; however this is o¤set by the nancial costs. One of
the criticisms leveled at the above work, is the fact that their model does not consider the
agency problems arising between creditors and shareholders. This is depicted in Claytons
(2009) work. The conclusions derived by the author go against Brander and Lewis (1986)
conclusions. The paper shows that when rms have an investment option, leverage leads
to a less aggressive output competition behavior and this is due to the existence of agency
problems.
While Brander and Lewis (1986) present a general model, without specifying whether
products are homogeneous or di¤erentiated,4 and whether uncertainty a¤ects demand
or costs, other authors have explored more specic models and analyzed the impact of
changes in parameters such as the level of uncertainty and the level of di¤erentiation
among products, on the equilibrium output and debt levels. This type of approach is fol-
4According to Mathis and Koscianski (2002, 443) The second criterion for dening a market structure
is the degree of product di¤erentiation across the goods sold by di¤erent rms in the market. An
homogeneous product oligopoly means that rms produce identical products, whereas in a di¤erentiated
product oligopoly, rms produce similar products but which are not identical.
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lowed by Wanzenried (2003), Frank and Le Pape (2008) and Haan and Toolsema (2008)
who analyze a two-stage di¤erentiated goods duopoly model with demand uncertainty.
Frank and Le Pape (2008) only analyze Cournot competition whereas Haan and Toolsema
(2008) use numerical analysis to study how the equilibrium is a¤ected by demand uncer-
tainty and the substitutability of products both under Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Frank and le Pape (2008) conclude that the bankruptcy probability decreases with the de-
mand uncertainty and the increase of the degree of substitutability. Haan and Toolsema
(2008) reach the same conclusion in both competition model: Bertrand and Cournot.
Wanzenrieds (2003) conclusions are similar, but their contribution is the analysis of the
welfare e¤ects of debt issue.
The impact of debt in predatory behavior models is quite di¤erent. According to Is-
taitieh and Fernández (2006) in predatory models leveraged rms decrease output, the
unleveraged rival has the incentive to increase output or cut prices to drive the lever-
aged rm out of the market. The works of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Khanna and
Tice (2000), Kovenock and Phillips (1997) and Glazer (1994) are highlighted. Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990) defend that agency problems have a predatory e¤ect on nancing
decisions; debt means that rms have a less aggressive behavior in the output market.
Khanna and Tice (2000) concluded that the biggest and most protable rms are more
aggressive than the most indebted. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) argued that rms fol-
lowing a recapitalization and belonging to the most concentrated industries are more
likely not to invest and not survive. Glazer (1994) analyzes the e¤ect of debt maturity
in the output market decisions. According to the author, rms with a debt with longer
maturity tend to behave less aggressively in the output market. From the analysis of the
previous works we conclude that predatory behavior models reach di¤erent conclusions
from models that emphasize the role of limited liability because they incorporate in the
model some aspects not considered in models that emphasize the role of limited liability.
These aspects include, in particular, agency problems, imperfections in the capital market
and the e¤ect of the investment.
The work of Povel and Raith (2004) incorporates the two models (limited liability
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theory and predatory behavior model) the authors derive the optimal contract debt in
a duopoly model with competition in prices and quantities. Aggressive behavior caused
by the increase in debt depends, according to the authors, on the existing nancial con-
straints.
Other authors analyze the relationship between the product market with investment
in R&D, as can be seen in Vives (2008) and Sacco and Schmutzlers (2011) works. The
authors studied the relationship between product market and capital invested in R&D.
The R&D investment can be interpreted as a di¤erentiating factor that can lead to prod-
uct di¤erentiation or the di¤erentiation of the production process. The authors conclude
that there is a U-shaped relation between competition and R&D investment, except in
the case of rms that were initially less ine¢cient. The study by Jensen and Showalter
(2004) emphasizes the link between product market, capital structure and R&D invest-
ment in patent races. This study argues that high levels of debt are associated with lower
investments in patent races. This is supported in the empirical study.
Table 2.1 summarizes the di¤erences between the aforementioned studies. From the
analysis of table 2.1 we can conclude that the studies linking the capital structure with
output market competition use mostly the Cournot duopoly model and develop limited
liability models.
It should be highlighted that the existing empirical work relating nancial and output
market decisions clearly conrms the strategic role of debt on the output market. However,
the sign of the impact of greater leverage on the output market is not so clear-cut. Table
2.2 summarizes the empirical literature on the strategic role of debt. From the analysis of
table 2.2 we can conclude that the works of Campos (2000), Erol (2003), Lyandres (2006)
are consistent with the role of limited liability i.e. debt incites a more aggressive behavior
on prices or quantities. The works of Chevalier (1995b), Khanna and Tice (2000) and
Zingales (1998) are more consistent with the predatory behavior models, i.e., debt leads
to a less aggressive behavior. Studies of Jensen and Showalter (2004), Opler and Titman
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Over time, many studies have been developed to assess the best nancial distress and
bankruptcy prediction model. The main objective of these studies is the classication
of rms with nancial health and the prediction of bankruptcy risk and/or insolvency.
Political, social and economic consequences are the main reasons why many researchers
focus on the best model(s) for the prediction of the probability of nancial distress.
The denition of default is not consensual. Beaver (1966) denes default as the rms
inability to meet its obligations as they mature, this can be checked if there is bank-
ruptcy, bond default, an overdrawn bank account, or nonpayment of a preferred stock
dividend. Article 3 of the Código dos Processos de Recuperação da Empresa e da Falên-
cia (CPEREF) denes an insolvent rm as one that in the lack of own resources and lack
of credit, is unable to meet its obligations punctually. There are certain facts to classify
a rm as insolvent, such as: non-compliance with tax and social security, non-compliance
in the payment of wages, failure to comply with the repayment of loans and interest pay-
ments, entry of the application in recovery process and bankruptcy. This setting is used
by Altman (1968), Deakin (1972), Stiglitz (1972), Zavgren (1985), Brander and Lewis
(1986), Frank and Le Pape (2008) and Haan and Toolsema (2008), Pindado, Rodrigues
and de la Torre (2008) and Clayton (2009). According to Dwyer and Kocagil (2004, 5)
the proposals for the new Basel Capital Accord (BIS II) have stimulated debates about
what constitutes an appropriate denition of default. RiskCalc applies the criteria used
by most of the advanced economies in the world. Default is dened as any of the following
events:
 90 days past due
 Bankruptcy
 Placement on internal non-accrual list
 Write-down"
The study of the default probability is intended to work mostly as a warning sign
for certain organizational entities. A high number of bankruptcies originate not only
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in a rise in unemployment as well as a substantial increase of direct and indirect rm
costs. Altman (1984) estimated that the increase in these costs, in the case of U.S. rms,
represent about 20% of the rm value assets. In addition to the rm, the agents that are
most a¤ected by default, are the creditors, who see their costs increase, not only the legal
and administrative costs related to debt collection, but also the substantial loss of credit
(capital and interest). According to Altman and Saunders (1998) the dramatic evolution
of models for measuring credit risk, is not only due to the increasing of the number of
bankruptcies, but also to the need to hold more and better information about the debtor,
the existence of more competitive margins on loans; the decline of the value of real assets
which implies lower collateral; and the dramatic growth of risk management instruments
and credit derivatives. The equity holders of the rm sees probability of dilution of equity
or total loss increase when the probability of default increases.
Thus, the analysis of the bankruptcy probability aims mainly to serve as a management
tool or information decision support, not only for the rm, but also for all stakeholders
who directly or indirectly have any relationship with the rm. For all other entities (credit
institutions, suppliers, creditors, etc...) those which hold or may have some relationship
with rms that have some probability of default, allows them to make a set of preventive
measures and adjust.
There exists a proliferation of models of bankruptcy probability analysis. Amongst the
existing studies, we highlight the work of Beaver (1966), a pioneer in the research of the
insolvency through nancial ratios, using univariate analysis. The use of multiple linear
discriminant analysis arose from the work of Altman (1968), a crucial milestone for the
study of nancial distress. The Z-Score and Zeta models, developed by Altman (1968) and
Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977), respectively, are the most discussed techniques
in empirical studies. Zavgren (1985) developed a model of bankruptcy prediction based
on the logistic analysis (Logit). Zmijewski (1984) used the Probit model to estimate the
probability of nancial distress.
However, what distinguishes the aforementioned studies is only the applied statistic
model. None of the previous studies analyzed the essence of the bankruptcy probability,
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i.e. how the probability varies with the nancial structure and market output decisions
in a competitive and uncertain market. This analysis is depicted in the following chapter.
2.4 Studies that relate capital structure, output mar-
ket and bankruptcy probability
Despite the vast literature on bankruptcy probability, the existing literature is constituted
essentially by prediction models. In other words, there is a lack of theoretical models
to explain bankruptcy probability. The probability of default depends not only on the
level of debt, but also on operational factors that allows a rm to meet its obligations.
The relationship between the decisions about the nancial structure, the market output
and the bankruptcy probability has been analyzed theoretically by a small number of
authors. This was discussed in more depth in the work of Frank and Le Pape (2008)
and Haan and Toolsema (2008). Frank and Le Pape (2008) and Haan and Toolsema
(2008) used numerical simulations to analyze the impact of demand uncertainty and
the degree of product di¤erentiation on the probability of bankruptcy risk. The authors
come to similar conclusions; the probability of bankruptcy is decreasing with the degree of
product di¤erentiation when goods are complementary and it is increasing with the degree
of product di¤erentiation when the goods are substitutes. Moreover, the probability of
default is decreasing with the level of uncertainty. However the authors assume some
assumptions: rms are symmetric, demand is linear, there is a uniform distribution and
marginal costs are constant. It is important to analyze all possible situations for the
degree of uncertainty and see how the analysis is modied if rms are not symmetric in
a competitive market.
It should be highlighted that there are some empirical works that relate nancial de-
cisions, output market decisions and the bankruptcy probability. Table 2.3 summarizes
some recent empirical works. By analyzing table 2.3 we can see that empirical studies
demonstrate that there is a relationship between debt and bankruptcy probability (An-
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tunes et al, 2010 and Chacharat et al, 2010) and between debt, quantity or price delivery,
market conditions (higher or lower concentration, industry performance) and bankruptcy
probability (Borenstein and Rose, 1995, Evrensel, 2008 and Opler and Titman, 1994).
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter revised the literature on the relationship between three themes essential to
the success of a rm: the decisions on capital structure, market output decisions and
bankruptcy probability. We found that there are already some studies that relate the rst
two topics. Regarding the probability of bankruptcy it appears that the vast majority
of the literature presents models to predict the probability of bankruptcy, distinguishing
themselves according to the technique used to forecast. However there is a gap in the
literature concerning the relationship between nancial decisions, output market decisions





The aim of this work is to study whether bankruptcy probability depends on the nancial
structure and output market decisions. In particular, we want to analyze the impact of
changes in the level of demand uncertainty, the degree of product substitutability and
the degree of asymmetry in level of e¢ciency on the equilibrium bankruptcy probability.
After the analysis of the existing literature in the area we conclude that there is a short-
age of studies relating nancial decisions with output market decisions and bankruptcy
probability for asymmetric rms. The few existing studies limit their analysis to a sce-
nario of symmetry between rms. To achieve this objective the following guidelines were
developed:
 Modeling of the problem taking into account the aforementioned studies;
 Problem resolution, dividing the resolution into two steps;
 Numerical analysis of the problem under study;
 Presentation of the main results.
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3.2 Model
This dissertation considers a particular case of Brander and Lewis (1986) model, where the
duopolists produce di¤erentiated products, demand is linear, marginal costs are constant
and the uncertainty in the model is on the demand side (this model has been considered
by other authors, such as Haan and Toolsema (2008), Wanzenried (2003)).
We are facing a typical situation of strategic interaction, where the decisions of a rm
a¤ect their payo¤s and the payo¤s obtained by the other rm. This interaction is mod-
eled using non-cooperative game theory (according to Schmalensee and Willig (2003,261)
Non-cooperative game theory is a way of modeling and analyzing situations in which
each players optimal decisions depends on his beliefs or expectations about the play of
his opponents. The modeling in game theory involves the denition of players, strategies
and payo¤s. According to Mathis and Koscianski (2002, 476 and 477) the players in a
game are dened as rational decision makers with the goal of selecting the strategy that
yields the best payo¤ to the player, given the strategies available to the other players
in the game. The strategies are the set of all alternative choices available to all the
players in a game. The payo¤s are the return a player in a game receives from selecting
a particular strategy, contingent on the strategies chosen by other players in the game.
In our case there are two rms that decide (rm i and rm j) and we consider a two
stage duopoly Cournot model with product di¤erentiation. In the rst stage each rm
(rm i and rm j) decides the nancial structure, i.e., the level of debt and equity in the
capital structure. In the second stage each rm takes its decision on the output market.
We start by analyzing the case of symmetric constant marginal costs; then we analyze
the case where the two rms have di¤erent marginal costs, thus we have an asymmetric
duopoly model. Figure 3.1 shows the timing of the game.
Let qi and qj be the output of rms i and j, pi and pj be the price of rms i and
j. q0 represents the quantity consumed of all other products (with a price normalized
to unity). The parameter  corresponds to the degree of substitutability between the
products, with  2 [0; 1]. When  = 0, products are completely di¤erentiated, thus each
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Figure 3.1: Timing of the game
rm can behave as a monopolist. When  = 1, the two products are perfect substitutes.
Parameter i and j represent the expected size of the market, i ; j ; i and j are
positive constant. Following Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984), we assume that
the utility function is quadratic:











Furthermore, we assume that i = j = ; and i = j = 1: The consumer chooses
qi; qj; q0 so as to maximize U subject to piqi + pjqj + q0 =M . The budget constraint can
be written as q0 = M   piqi   pjqj. Substituting this expression in the utility function,
the consumers problem can be rewritten as:
max
qi;qj












 pi +   qi   qj = 0





pi =   qi   qj
pj =   qj   qi
The rst order conditions dene the inverse demand, which is given by:
pi =   qi   qj + zi (3.2)
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The observed size of the market depends on the random variable zi that represents the
e¤ect of an exogenous demand shock, in other words, there is uncertainty regarding the
size of the market. It is assumed that this variable is distributed in the interval [ z; z]
according to the uniform density function, i.e., f(zi) = 12z . We assume that zi and zj are
independent and identically distributed.
In the rst stage, rms choose simultaneously their debt levels so as to maximize the
value of the rm. The value of the rm is equal to the sum of the equity value and debt
value. We represent the debt obligation of the rm i by bi. bi is the amount that the rm
i pays at the end of the game to bondholders, if it has su¢cient operating prots to do
so. If the realized operating prots are less than bi, all the operating prots obtained will
be used to pay bondholders. The operating prots (revenue less costs) are given by:
Ri = (  qi   qj + zi   ci) qi (3.3)
In the second stage of the game the manager maximizes the expected value of the rm
to shareholders. The expected equity value is given by:
V i(qi; qj; bi; z) =
zZ
bzi




where bzi(qi;qj;bi) is the critical value of zi such that the operating prot of the rm is
just enough for the rm to meet its debt obligations. This critical state of the world is
implicitly dened by:
(  qi   qj + zi   ci) qi   bi = 0 (3.5)
It should be noted that the critical state of the world is inuenced by the quantity
choices of the two rms and by the rms debt level. This implies that bzi(qi;qj;bi) is
determined endogenously in the second stage of the game.
In the rst stage rms choose simultaneously their debt levels so as to maximize the
value of the rm. The value of the rm is equal to the sum of the equity value and debt
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value. The expected value of debt is given by:
Wi(qi; qj; bi; z) = Pr(zi > bzi)bi +
bziZ
 z




Note that bi is di¤erent from Wi. bi is the amount that the rm i pays at the end
of the game to bondholders, which includes capital amortization and interest. Wi is the
expected value of debt, which takes into account the probability of the rm not paying in
full bi, i.e. if this probability is positive Wi < bi:
Thus, the value of the rm is equal to the expected operating prots of the rm:
Y i(qi; qj; bi;z) = V
i(qi; qj; bi;z) +W








Pr(zi > bzi)bi +
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dzidzj   ciqi   cjqj
(3.8)
This is a game with two decision stages and to determine the equilibrium (optimal
decisions for rms) it is necessary to solve the game using the concept of subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE). The game is solved backwards, that is one starts by determining
the Nash equilibrium1 in the second stage of the game; in this case, we start by computing
1It is said that a combination of strategies is a Nash Equilibrium when each strategy is the best
possible response to the strategies of the other players, and this is true for all players, i.e. no player gains
by unilaterally deviating.
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the Nash equilibrium of the second stage game as a function of the debt levels chosen by
the rms in the rst stage. Then we solve the rst stage game. In this stage rms take
their nancial decisions, considering their impact on the output market equilibrium, so
as to maximize the value of the rm, thus determining, the SPNE.2
In order to solve the model it is often necessary to use the chain rule, the fundamental
theorem of integral calculus and the Leibniz rule. We are facing a maximization problem
(where the maximum is obtained by solving the rst order conditions) whose objective
function in the rst stage is given by (3.7) and in the second stage is given by (3.4). In
both cases, the objective function involves parametric integrals. According to Pires (2011,
260) an integral is dened as parametric as long as in the integral only one variable is
the variable of integration (the variable of integration is zi). The following theorem Pires
(2011, 261) will be frequently applied:
Theorem 3.1 Let '1(x) and '2(x) be di¤erentiable functions in [a; b] dened on a closed
















To better follow the model resolution, table 3.1 summarizes the variables used:
2According to Selten (1965) cited by Gibbsons (1992) A Nash Equilibrium is a sub-game-perfect if
the players strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
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Table 3.1: Variables of the model.
Variables Meaning
qi; qj Output of rms i and j
bi; bj Debt obligation of rms i and j
Ri Operating prots of rm i
zi Random variable that represents the uncertainty regarding the size of the market
bzi Critical value of zi
 Degree of substitutability
i Size of the market
Y i; Y j Firm value
V i; V j Expected equity value
W i;W j Expected value of debt
i; j Bankruptcy probability
3.3 Solving the model
3.3.1 Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the game
In the second stage of the game, rm i chooses its quantity, qi, so as to maximize the




(  2qi   qj + zi   ci)
1
2z




However, taking into account the denition of bzi, the second term is equal to zero. Thus,
after integrating the rst term, the rst-order condition is given by:
z + 2  4qi + bzi   2qj   2ci = 0
The rst order condition for rm j is derived in a similar manner. Note that the
rst order conditions depend on the critical states of the world, bzi and bzj, which in turn
depend on qi and qj. This implies that, in order to get the Nash equilibrium of the second
stage game, we need to solve simultaneously the system of rst order conditions and the
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two conditions that dene the critical states of the world. In other words, for an interior




z + 2  4qi + bzi   2qj   2ci = 0
z + 2  4qj + bzj   2qi   2cj = 0
(  qi   qj + bzi   ci) qi   bi = 0
(  qj   qi + bzj   cj) qj   bj = 0
It turns out that this system does not have an analytical solution. In fact, through
substitution, it can be shown that solving this system is equivalent to solving a polynomial
equation of the fourth order, which does not have a closed form solution.
It should be noted that, for some values of (bi; bj) one or both of the critical states
of the world may be equal to  z or equal to z. In these cases the third and/or fourth
need to be substituted by bzi =  z or bzi = z. A complete analysis of all the possible Nash
equilibria involve computing these corner solutions.
Since the model cannot be solved analytically, we developed a GAUSS code to solve
the model numerically (the code is presented in the Appendix). Considering the various
types of possible equilibria, we ran simulations for many values of the parameters  and
z (so as to analyze how the equilibrium changes with the parameter values). For each set
of parameter values, we determine the Nash Equilibrium of the second stage game, for
many possible combinations of the debt levels (bi; bj). Let qi (bi; bj), q

j (bi; bj), bzi (bi; bj)
and bzj (bi; bj) be the Nash equilibrium quantities and critical states of the world for given
debt levels (bi; bj).
3.3.2 Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium
After computing the Nash equilibrium of the second stage game as a function of the debt
levels chosen by the rms in the rst stage we solved the rst stage game using backwards
induction. In this stage, rms take their nancial decisions, considering their impact on
the output market equilibrium, so as to maximize the value of the rm, thus determining
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the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).
As mentioned above, we developed a GAUSS code to solve the model numerically,
considering the various types of possible equilibria, for many values of the parameters 
and z (so as to analyze how the equilibrium changes with the parameter values). The
program rst determines the Nash Equilibrium of the second stage game, for given debt
levels (bi; bj), and then for each (bi; bj) the equilibrium value of each rm (Yi; Yj), is com-
puted. This is repeated for many (bi; bj) and the equilibrium values of Yi and Yj are saved
in two matrices. The equilibrium of the rst stage game is then determined. We identify,
for a given debt level of the other rm, the rms level of debt that maximizes its value,
thus determining the rms best response. The Nash equilibrium of the debt game occurs
when we nd a vector (bi ; b

j ) such that the two rms are simultaneously in their best re-
sponses. Thus (bi ; b






corresponding SPNE quantities (qi ; q

j ) of the second stage game are computed as well
as other equilibrium variables like the bankruptcy probabilities (i ; 

j );the equilibrium
interest rate (ri ; r

j ) and so on.
Applying the Leibniz rule to the expected value of debt, the equilibrium expected
value of debt in the rst stage of the game is given by:



















(bzi )2   z2

(3.9)
Applying the Leibniz rule to the expected value of equity, the equilibrium expected
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(3.10)











Applying the Leibniz rule in the expected value of welfare, the equilibrium expected
welfare level in the rst stage of the game is given by:


















There are certain combinations of the parameters  and z that originate multiple
equilibria. Such situation occurs mainly for  close to 0 and z < 1, so we decided to
eliminate these observations. We chose to use  = 5 and zmax = 2: The chosen values do
not a¤ect the results qualitatively. To avoid areas where bi does not intersect within the
feasible areas, we dened an upper bound of debt. The debt cannot be higher than the
expected monopoly prots. We dened a value that is between the monopoly prot and
the duopoly prot as the upper bound of debt.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of the results
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present the results of our numerical simulations. The analysis is divided
into two parts. The rst part analyzes the symmetric case (ci = cj = 0), where both rms
are equally e¢cient. This case replicates Haan and Toolsema (2008) but using a more
general numerical model as we also study cases where the equilibrium involves corner
solutions for the critical states of the world. The second part examines the e¤ect of
cost asymmetries on the equilibrium debt levels, output levels, the value of each rm,
the implicit interest rates, the bankruptcy probabilities and the welfare. To the best
of our knowledge, the second part of the work is new and thus presents an interesting
contribution to the literature relating capital market structure, output market competition
and bankruptcy risk.
In our numerical simulation, we consider z values in the interval [0; 2] and  values in
the interval [0; 1]. After the analysis of the values obtained, we concluded that low values
of z (z < 0:8) and  ( < 0:1) that originate multiple equilibria, some with inconsistent
results, so we decided to restrict our analysis to feasible areas (z  0:8 and   0:1). It
should be noted that this type of restriction was also considered by Haan and Toolsema
(2008) who excluded from the analysis small values of z and , values that are near to
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the extremes. They also did not consider large values for the parameters, to avoid corner
solutions.
We chose to use  = 5; the choice of values has not a signicant inuence on the
nal qualitative results. For the amount of debt, debt cannot be higher than expected
monopoly prots, so we decided to use a weighted average of monopoly and duopoly
prots as the upper bound of debt.
4.2 Symmetric duopoly
This subsection studies the results of a symmetric two stage duopoly model where rms
rst decide their nancial structure and next choose the quantity to produce. Our analysis
is focused on the equilibrium of the whole game (the subgame perfect equilibrium).1
The objective is to analyze how the equilibrium values of the variables change with the
uncertainty level, z; and with the degree of product substitutability, .
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the equilibrium levels of debt as function of the degree of
product substitutability, , and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z. These
gures allow us to conclude the following:
Result 4.1 The SPNE level of debt, b, is strictly positive and decreasing with the level
of demand uncertainty, z. On the other hand, the degree of product substitutability does
not have a monotonic impact on b. For small values of demand uncertainty, b is
decreasing with product substitutability. However, for higher values of demand uncertainty,
binitially increases with  but after a certain point follows a U relationship with .
The results are consistent with the Frank and Le Pape (2008) work.
Figures 4.3 shows the equilibrium ouput level as function of the degree of product
substitutability,  and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z. The gure
allow us to conclude the following:
1It should be noted that one could also analyze the Nash equilibrium of the second stage, which is






Figure 4.1: SPNE debt level as a function of the degree of product substitubility and the
level of demand uncertainty.
Result 4.2 The SPNE level output, q, is decreasing with the degree of product substi-
tutability,  and increasing with the level of demand uncertainty z. However, the impact
of demand uncertainty is relatively small.
We found similar results to Frank and Le Pape (2008).
Regarding the e¤ect of the demand uncertainty level, z;on the equilibrium debt levels
and on the output levels, the intuition of the results presented above is that, when the
level of uncertainty is higher, for xed debt level, rms have a more aggressive behavior in
the output market. Intuitively, the increase in the uncertainty level implies that there are
more good states of the world with positive marginal prots, thus the expected marginal
prots conditional on zi > bzi increase, hence it is optimal to produce a higher quantity
(note that increasing z also means that there are more states of the world with more
negative marginal prots, but equityholders do no care about these states of the world,
unless the rm is all equity nanced, i.e. since they are protected by limited liability).
However, considering the result 4.1, rms can get the same strategic e¤ect with a lower
level of debt. Therefore, rms act in a more conservative manner in the debt market when
uncertainty increases.

















Figure 4.2: SPNE debt level as a function of the degree of product substitutability, for
several values of demand uncertainty.
product substitutability, , and on the level of demand uncertainty, z. These gures allow

















Figure 4.3: SPNE output level as a function of the degree of product substitutability.
Result 4.3 The SPNE interest rate, r, is increasing with the degree of product substi-
tutability, , and with the level of demand uncertainty, z:The impact is more signicant
for high values of  ( > 0:6) and z (z > 1:6).


Figure 4.4: SPNE interest rate as a function of the degree of product substitutability and
the level of demand uncertainty.
Figure 4.6 shows the equilibrium bankruptcy probability as function of the degree of
product substitutability, , and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z. The


















Figure 4.5: SPNE interest rate as a function of the degree of product substitutability for
various levels of demand uncertainty.
Result 4.4 The SPNE bankruptcy probability, , is increasing with the degree of product
substuitability, , and it is decreasing with the level of demand uncertainty, z:
These results are consistent with the Haan and Toolsema (2008) work. With regard to



























Figure 4.6: SPNE bankruptcy probability as a function of the degree of product substi-
tutability for various levels of demand uncertainty.
Regarding the e¤ect of the demand uncertainty level, z;on the bankruptcy probability,
if there is an increase in the level of uncertainty, the bankruptcy probability decreases.
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We have three e¤ects. The direct e¤ect is that, for given debt and quantity levels, the
increase in the uncertainty level, increases the bankruptcy probability. Regarding the
indirect e¤ects the fact that there is larger uncertainty leads rms to behave in a more
aggressive manner in the output market. This e¤ect tends to increase the bankruptcy
probability. However, the greater uncertainty leads rms to be more conservative in the
debt market, thus issuing less debt. A lower debt lowers the bankruptcy probability,
directly and indirectly, through its inuence on the second period equilibrium quantities.
We conclude that the third e¤ect dominates, i.e. rms behave less aggressively in the
debt market when uncertainty is higher, which leads to lower equilibrium bankruptcy
probabilities.
Figure 4.7 shows the equilibrium expected equity value depends of the degree of prod-
uct substitutability, , and it depends on the level of demand uncertainty, z. The gure
allow us to conclude the following:
Result 4.5 The SPNE expected equity value, V , is decreasing with the degree of product
substitutability, , and it is increasing with the level of demand uncertainty, z:




























Figure 4.7: SPNE expected equity value as a function of the degree of product substi-
tutability for various levels of demand uncertainty.
Figure 4.8 shows the equilibrium expected debt value as function of the degree of
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product substitutability, , and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z. The
gure allows us to conclude the following:
Result 4.6 The SPNE expected debt value, W , is decreasing with the level of demand
uncertainty, z: On the other hand, the degree of product substitutability does not have a
monotonic impact on W . For small values of demand uncertainty, W  is decreasing
with product substitutability. However, for higher values of demand uncertainty, W 





























Figure 4.8: SPNE expected debt value as a function of the degree of product substitutabil-
ity for various levels of demand uncertainty.
Figure 4.9 shows the equilibrium welfare depends on the degree of product substi-
tutability, . The gure allow us to conclude the following:
Result 4.7 The SPNE welfare level, Wel, is decreasing with the degree of product sub-
stitutability, , and decreasing with the level of demand uncertainty, z. However the
impact of demand uncertainty is relatively small.
Figure 4.10 shows the equilibrium rm value as function of the degree of product
substitutability, ; and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z. This gure
















Figure 4.9: SPNE welfare as a function of the degree of product substitutability for various
levels of demand uncertainty.
Result 4.8 The SPNE rm value, Y , is decreasing with the degree of product substi-
tutability, , and with the level of demand uncertainty, z: However, the impact of the level
of demand uncertainty, z; is relatively small.
The results conrm the results obtained by Haan and Toolsema (2008) and Franck
and Le Pape (2008).


Figure 4.10: SPNE expected rm value as a function of the degree of product substi-
tutability and the level of demand uncertainty.
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4.3 Asymmetric duopoly
This subsection studies the results of an asymmetric two stage duopoly model where rms
rst decide their nancial structure and next choose the quantity to produce. We consider
that rms di¤er in their marginal production cost. Firm j has a null production cost while
rm i has marginal cost ci. We study what happens as rm i becomes less e¢cient by
analyzing the SPNE as the marginal cost of rm i, ci; varies between 0 (symmetric case)
and 2.
This section aims to examine how the variables equilibrium levels (debt, output, im-
plicit interest rates, bankruptcy probabilities, equity value, value of the rm and welfare)
vary as the marginal cost of rm i increases (x-axis), considering three possible values for
the degree of product substitutability,  ( = 0:2;  = 0:6 and  = 1). Three graphs
are presented for each variable (the rst corresponds z = 0:8; the second z = 1:2 and the
third one with z = 1:6), this subdivision allows to check if the behavior is stable with
the level of demand uncertainty, z:
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show the debt level of the rm i and the debt level of the rm
j as function of the marginal cost of production of the rm i, ci. Figures allow us to
conclude the following:
Result 4.9 The SPNE level of debt of the rm i, bi ; is decreasing with the marginal cost
of production of the rm i, ci: The decrease is more pronounced for high levels of demand
uncertainty, z: However the SPNE level of debt of the rm j, bj ; is increasing with the
marginal cost of production of the rm i, ci: The increase is more pronounced for high
levels of demand uncertainty, z:
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show the output level of the rm i and the output level of the
rm j as function of the marginal cost of production of the rm i, ci. Figures allow us to
conclude the following:
Result 4.10 The SPNE level of output rm i, qi ; is decreasing with the rms marginal
cost of production, ci. On the contrary, the SPNE level of ouput of rm j, q

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Figure 4.12: SPNE debt level of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the marginal costs
of the rival.
with the rivals marginal cost of production.
Regarding the e¤ect of the marginal production cost of rm i, ci in the debt level and
in the output level of the two rms, the results presented above show that as the rm
becomes less e¢cient (i.e. their marginal production costs increases), the ine¢cient rm
adopts a more conservative approach in the debt market and in the output market. The
intuition for this result is that, an increase in the marginal production cost leads to a
decrease in the marginal prot which implies a decrease in the debt and output levels.
The more e¢cient rm has the opposite behavior, i.e. it becomes more aggressive in
the debt market and in the output market. These e¤ects are more pronounced for high
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Figure 4.14: SPNE output level of the more e¢cient rm as a function of rivals marginal
costs.
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 show the interest rate of the rm i and the interest rate of the
rm j as function of the marginal cost of production of the rm i, ci. Figures allow us to
conclude the following:
Result 4.11 The SPNE interest rate of rm i, ri ; is increasing with the marginal cost
of production of the rm i, ci: On the contrary, the SPNE interest rate of rm j, r

j ; is
decreasing with the marginal cost of production of the rm i, ci: The change (increase or
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Figure 4.16: SPNE interest rate level of the more e¢cient rm as a function of rivals
marginal costs.
Figures 4.17 and 4.18 show the bankruptcy probability of rm i and the bankruptcy
probability of rm j as function of the marginal cost of production of the rm i, ci. These
gures allow us to conclude the following:
Result 4.12 The SPNE bankruptcy probability of rm i, i ; follows a U relationship
with the marginal cost of production of the rm i, ci and the SPNE of the bankruptcy
probability of the rm j, j ; follows a inverted U relationship with the marginal cost
of production of the rm i, ci. The change of behavior occurs for intermediate levels of
marginal cost of production of the rm i, ci; in the rm i case and low values of marginal



























0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00
=0,8 =1,2 =1,6


























0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00
=0,8 =1,2 =1,6
Figure 4.18: SPNE bankruptcy probability of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the
rivals marginal costs.
Regarding the e¤ect of the marginal production cost of rm i, ci in the bankruptcy
probabilities, the result presented above shows that the e¤ect of the increasing ci has the
opposite e¤ect on the less e¢cient rm, rm i (U relationship) and the more e¢cient rm,
rm j (inverted U relationship). Intuitively, it can be stated that there is a direct and
an indirect e¤ect. The direct e¤ect is that the increasing of the marginal cost of the rm
i; increases its bankruptcy probability, having the opposite e¤ect on the more e¢cient
rm. This direct e¤ect dominates for high levels of asymmetry (ci > 1). The indirect
e¤ect results from the fact that the increase in the marginal cost of the rm i leads to a
more conservative behavior in the debt and output markets which implies a decrease in
the bankruptcy probability (as explained in the symmetric case). On the contrary, the
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behavior of the more e¢cient rm is more aggressive which leads to an increase in the
bankruptcy probability. This indirect e¤ect dominates for low levels of asymmetry.
Figures 4.19 and 4.20 show the expected equity values of rm i and rm j, respectively,
as function of the marginal cost of production of the rm i, ci. These gures allow us to
conclude the following:
Result 4.13 The SPNE expected equity value of the rm i, V i ; is decreasing with the
rms marginal cost of production of the rm i, ci: On the contrary, the SPNE expected
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Figure 4.20: SPNE expected equity value of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the
rivals marginal costs.
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Figures 4.21 and 4.22 show the expected debt values of rm i and rm j as function
of the marginal cost of production of rm i, ci. The gures allow us to conclude the
following:
Result 4.14 The SPNE expected debt value of the rm i,W i ; is decreasing with marginal
cost of production of the rm i, ci: On the contrary, the SPNE expected debt value of rm
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Figure 4.22: SPNE expected debt value of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the
rivals marginal costs.
Figure 4.23 shows the welfare level as function of the marginal cost of production of
rm i, ci. The gure allow us to conclude the following:
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Result 4.15 The SPNE of the welfare, Wel; is decreasing with the marginal cost of
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Figure 4.23: SPNE expected social welfare as a function of less e¢cient rms marginal
costs.
Results 4.13 and 4.14 allows us to conclude the following:
Result 4.16 The SPNE expected value of the rm i, Y i ; is decreasing with marginal
cost of production of the rm i, ci: On the contrary, the SPNE expected value of rm j,
Y j ; is increasing with the marginal cost of production of rm i, ci:
After analyzing the results we conclude that in the symmetric case we conrmed
some results obtained by Toolsema and Haan (2008) and Frank and Le Pappe (2008).
In the asymmetric case, our result provide an interesting contribution to the literature.
In particular, we emphasize the more conservative behavior of the ine¢cient rm and
the more aggressive behavior of the rival rm. The e¤ect of increasing the marginal
cost of the less e¢cient rm on the bankruptcy probabilities depends on whether the
direct e¤ect or the indirect e¤ect dominate. The direct e¤ect dominates for high levels of
asymmetry while the indirect e¤ect dominates for low levels of asymmetry. With regard
to the variables interest rate, expected equity value, expected debt value and welfare, the




The present work examined, analytically and numerically, how the market structure in-
uences nancial and product market decisions and, consequently, how it a¤ects the
bankruptcy risk. We analyzed the impact of changes in the level of demand uncertainty,
the degree of product di¤erentiation and the asymmetry in the marginal production costs
on the risk of bankruptcy. Although some specic conclusions were already reported
throughout the text and at the end of the previous chapter, we now summarize the most
important results of this work.
Regarding the literature review we conclude that there are several studies that analyze
the strategic interaction between nancial decisions and output market decisions. In
addition, we nd that the existing literature on the bankruptcy probability has as its main
objective the identication of the best model to predict the bankruptcy risk. After the
literature review we conclude that the study of the interaction between the main decisions
of a rm (nancial decisions and output market decisions) and the probability of a rm
not meeting its obligations or going bankrupt is important. Considering the importance of
the subject, there is a need for interconnecting nancial decisions, output market decisions
and bankruptcy probabilities and furthermore ascertain how the variables analyzed change
when some important market structure parameters vary (such as changes in the level of
demand uncertainty, the level of product di¤erentiation and the cost asymmetry between
rms).
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We proceeded to the resolution of a model, using as a basis the fundamental concepts of
game theory and the few existing studies. We analyzed a two stage duopoly game model.
In the rst stage, rms decide the level of debt that maximizes the rm value and in the
second stage of the game, rms decide on the optimal quantity that maximizes rm value
for the shareholders. The model was solved backwards. We rst determined the Nash
equilibrium of the quantity decision game and then determined the equilibrium levels of
debt. Due to the complexity of the problem we had to solve the model analytically using
GAUSS. We determined the SPNE of some variables: debt levels, output levels, the value
of each rm, the implicit interest rates, the bankruptcy probabilities and the welfare. The
numerical model was run for many values of the parameter of the model in order to allow
us to study the impact of changes in the level of demand uncertainty, in the degree of
product substitutability and in the level of asymmetry in marginal production costs. We
studied two scenarios: one where the two rms have the same marginal costs (symmetric
case) and another one where rms di¤er in their marginal cost of production (asymmetric
case).
After the analysis of the results, we conclude that, in the symmetric model, the debt
decreases with uncertainty whereas the degree of product substitutability does not have a
monotonic impact on the equilibrium debt levels. Regarding the bankruptcy probability,
it is increasing with the degree of product substitutability and decreasing with uncertainty.
The result of the asymmetric case reveal that the SPNE output decreases with the
degree of product substitutability and with the rms marginal cost of production and, on
the contrary, it is increasing with the rival rm marginal production cost. These results
are similar to the ones obtained in traditional oligopoly models where the equilibrium
quantity of a rm is decreasing with its marginal costs and increasing with the rivals
marginal production costs. Moreover, the equilibrium debt level of the less e¢cient rm
is decreasing with its marginal cost of production while the most e¢cient rm has the
opposite behavior. This is a quite interesting result as it tells us that the less e¢cient rm
is more cautious and nances less with debt while the more e¢cient rm becomes «more
aggressive» in the debt market. A very interesting result is that there is a U shaped
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relationship between a rms marginal cost and its bankruptcy probability. This result
can be explained by the existence of direct and indirect e¤ects. On the one hand, for the
same debt level, increasing the marginal cost of the rm is expected to lead to an increase
on the bankruptcy probability. On the other hand, since the a decrease in e¢ciency
leads to lower levels of debt, this leads to a decrease on the bankruptcy probability. For
small levels of cost asymmetry the indirect e¤ect of decreasing the debt level is larger
than the direct e¤ect, thus we get the counterintuitive result that an increase in marginal
production costs lead to a lower probability of bankruptcy. For larger levels of ine¢ciency,
the direct e¤ect is larger than the indirect e¤ect and hence increasing ine¢ciency increases
the bankruptcy probability.
One interesting extension of this work would be to incorporate in the model the bank-
ruptcy costs that directly and indirectly a¤ect the rm.
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/* This program computes the SPNE of the Brander and Lewis model,*/
/* considering linear demands with di¤erentiated products, constant */
/* marginal costs which may be asymmetric, demand uncertainty with */
/*a uniform distribution of the uncertainty parameter and Cournot */
/* competition. Alpha is the dimension of the market, gama is the
/* di¤erentiation parameter zbarra is the uncertianty parameter and */
/*c1 and c2 are marginal costs. */
/* The program determines rst the NE of the second stage game,*/
/* for given debt levels (b1,b2) and for each (b1,b2) the equilibrium*/
/* value of each rm, (Y1,Y2), is computed. This is repeated for many*/
/* (b1,b2) and the equilibrium values of Y1 and Y2 are saved in two*/
/* matrices. Next the NE of the rst stage game is determined*/
/* (b1eq,b1eq) and the corresponding NE of the second stage game*/
/* and equilibrium bankruptcy probabilities are determined. */
/* This procedure is repeated for many values of the parameter values*/
/* so as to analyze how the equilibrium changes with changes in the */




/************** Inicial parameters of the model **************/
alpha=5; /* market dimension */
zbarmax=1.6; /* maximum value of the uncertainty degree */
zbarmin=1.6; /* minimum value of the uncertainty degree */
c1=0.5; /* marginal cost of rm 1 */
c2=0; /* marginal cost of rm 2 */
gamamax=1; /* maximum value of the di¤erentiation parameter */
lv
gamamin=0.95; /* minimum value of the di¤erentiation parameter */
zbarra=zbarmin;
saltozbar=0.10; /* step size for the iterations on the uncertainty degree */
saltgama=0.05; /* step size for the iterations on the uncertainty degree */
niterzbar=int((zbarmax-zbarmin)/saltozbar)+1; /*number of iterations for uncertainty
degree */
nitergam=int((gamamax-gamamin)/saltgama)+1; /*number of iterations for
di¤erentiation parameter */
/************Create matrices to keep the SPNE values of quantities, *************/



















/***********Start iterations of level of uncertainty (zbarra) ***********/
/****************and di¤erentiation level (gama)*****************/
iterzb=1;
do while zbarra <=zbarmax;
gama=gamamin;
iterga=1;
do while gama <=gamamax;
/**********************************************************************/
/***Finding the second stage NE for various levels of (b1,b2) and saving ***/
/***the NE value of each rm in a matrix which will be use to nd SPNE ***/
/**********************************************************************/
lvi
/******* This is to obtain the lower and upper bounds for b1 and b2 ********/
b1min=0;
b2min=0;
b1max=3.5; /*Debt cannot be higher than expected monopoly prots. Here we are
using an */
b2max=3.5; /*weighted average of monopoly and duopoly prots as the upper bound
of debt */
saltob=0.10; /* step size for the iterations on the debt levels */
niterb1=int((b1max-b1min)/saltob)+1;/*number of iterations for debt level of rm
1*/
niterb2=int((b2max-b2min)/saltob)+1;/*number of iterations for debt level of rm
2*/
y1mat=ones(niterb1,niterb2); /* create matrix to save the NE total value of rm 1 */
y1mat=y1mat*(-500);





/***********Start iterations of level of uncertainty (zbarra) ***********/
/****************and di¤erentiation level (gama)*****************/
iterb1=1;
do while b1<= b1max;
b2=b2min;
iterb2=1;
do while b2<= b2max;
/******************* Check if NE is interior for all 4 variables ********************/
x0 = {3, 3,0,0}; /* starting values of variables to be used in the constrained
optimization routine*/
_co_IneqProc=&ineqlim; /* ineqlim is the procedure where the inequality constraints
are dened */
_co_MaxIters=100; /* maximum number of iterations in the constrained
optimization */
{x,f,g,ret}=co(&fob,x0); /* this calls the routine to solve constrained optimization
problem. Objective function dened in procedure fob */
call coprt(x,f,g,ret);
if f<0.00001; /* if the optimal value of the objective function is very close to zero it
means that we found an interior NE */
goto nefound; /* if previous condition true can «jump» to the end of if cycles, since
lvii
NE was already found. Jump to line with level «nefound» */
else;
























goto nefound2; /* If we arrive here it means that no NE was found in the feasible






/****** Compute the NE total value of each rm and save it in the matrix *******/
y1=(alpha-x[1]-gama*x[2]-c1)*x[1]; /* The NE value of rm 1 is equal to the
equilibrium expected prot (considering
the NE values of q1 and q2) */
lviii
y2=(alpha-x[2]-gama*x[1]-c2)*x[2]; /* The NE value of rm 2 is equal to the
equilibrium expected prot (considering
the NE values of q1 and q2) */
y1mat[iterb1,iterb2]=y1; /* save the NE value of rm 1 in a matrix, where each row
corresponds to a value of b1, and each columnn to
the value of b2 */
y2mat[iterb1,iterb2]=y2; /* save the NE value of rm 1 in a matrix, where each row
corresponds to a value of b1, and each columnn to










/***** The iterations for the NE of the second stage game end here *****/
/****************************************************************/




do while iterb1 <= niterb1;
iterb2=1;




if y1mat[iterb1,iterb2]==maxc(y1col) and y2mat[iterb1,iterb2]==maxc(y2col); /* this
checks if a given (b1,b2) is a
NE */
if y1mat[iterb1,iterb2]==(-500) or y2mat[iterb1,iterb2]==(-500); /* if we are in the
region where no NE of 2nd stage game
was found, jump to line with level notane */
goto notane;
else;
b1eq=b1min+saltob*(iterb1-1); /* if NE is in feasible region, this gives us SPNE
value of b1 */
b2eq=b2min+saltob*(iterb2-1); /* if NE is in feasible region, this gives us SPNE
lix
value of b2 */











b1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=b1eq; /* save the SPNE of b1 in a matrix */




/**Compute the SPNE levels of q1, q2, theta1, theta2. W1, W2, V1, V2, r1, r2***/
/**and welfareThis is done by compute NE of the 2nd stage game, for the SPNE**/
/**************************value of (b1,b2)******************************/
/************************************************************************/




































teta1eq=(x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra); /* compute the SPNE of theta1 */
teta2eq=(x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra); /* compute the SPNE of theta2 */
teta1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=teta1eq; /* save the SPNE of theta1 in a matrix */
teta2eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=teta2eq; /* save the SPNE of theta2 in a matrix */
w1eq=(1-teta1eq)*b1+1/(4*zbarra)*x[1]*((x[3]+zbarra)*(2*alpha-2*c1-2*x[1]-
2*gama*x[2])+(x[3]^2-zbarra^2)); /* compute the SPNE of w1 */
w2eq=(1-teta2eq)*b2+1/(4*zbarra)*x[2]*((x[4]+zbarra)*(2*alpha-2*c2-2*x[2]-
2*gama*x[1])+(x[4]^2-zbarra^2)); /* compute the SPNE of w2 */
w1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=w1eq; /* save the SPNE of w1 in a matrix */
w2eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=w2eq; /* save the SPNE of w2 in a matrix */
v1eq=(1/(4*zbarra))*(x[1]*((zbarra-x[3])*(2*alpha-2*x[1]-2*c1-2*gama*x[2])+
(zbarra^2-x[3]^2))-2*b1*(zbarra-x[3])); /* compute the SPNE of v1 */
v2eq=(1/(4*zbarra))*(x[2]*((zbarra-x[4])*(2*alpha-2*x[2]-2*c2-2*gama*x[1])+
(zbarra^2-x[4]^2))-2*b2*(zbarra-x[4])); /* compute the SPNE of v2 */
v1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=v1eq; /* save the SPNE of v1 in a matrix */
v2eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=v2eq; /* save the SPNE of v2 in a matrix */
y1eqp=(alpha-x[1]-gama*x[2]-c1)*x[1]; /* compute the SPNE of y1 */
y2eqp=(alpha-x[2]-gama*x[1]-c1)*x[2]; /* compute the SPNE of y1 */
y1eqpmat[ iterzb,iterga]=y1eqp; /* save the SPNE of y1 in a matrix */
y2eqpmat[ iterzb,iterga]=y2eqp; /* save the SPNE of y2 in a matrix */
r1eq=(b1/w1eq)-1; /* compute the SPNE of r1 */
r2eq=(b2/w2eq)-1; /* compute the SPNE of r2 */
r1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=r1eq; /* save the SPNE of r1 in a matrix */
r2eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=r2eq; /* save the SPNE of r2 in a matrix */
welfeq=alpha*(x[1]+x[2])-(1/2)*(x[1]^2+2*gama*x[1]*x[2]+x[2]^2)-c1*x[1]-c2*x[2];
/* compute the SPNE of welfare */
lxi
welfeqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=welfeq; /* save the SPNE of welfare in a matrix */
q1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=x[1]; /* save the SPNE of q1 in a matrix */










/************* Here end the iteractions for zbarra and gama ****************/
/******************************************************************/
/********************** Output Section *****************************/
/******************************************************************/
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnmatb1eq.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix b1eq*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnmatb2eq.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix b2eq*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnteta1eq.out reset; /* output le just the
lxii
matrix teta1eqmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnteta2eq.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix teta2eqmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnw1eq.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix w1eqmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnw2eq.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix w2eqmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
lxiii
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnv1eq.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix v1eqmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnv2eq.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix v2eqmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresny1eqp.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix y1eqpmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresny2eqp.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix y2eqpmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;







format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnr1eq.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix r1eqmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnr2eq.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix r2eqmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnwelfeq.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix welfeqmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnq1eq.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix q1eqmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;







format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnq2eq.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix q2eqmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;






format /rdt 8,5; /* print number formatation */
output le=d:nMestradongaussresnnumberEN.out reset; /* output le just the
matrix welfeqmat*/
outwidth 150; /* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;





/**************** Procedures for the constrained optimization *****************/
/******************** Procedures for an interior NE ***********************/


























/****** Procedures for an z^1 = -zbar and z^2 = -zbar, q1 and q2 interior ******/



























/****** Procedures for an z^1 = -zbar and z2 interior, q1 and q2 interior *******/



























/****** Procedures for an z^1 interior and z2= -zbar , q1 and q2 interior ******/














/**************** Procedure for inequality constraints *****************/
proc ineqlim3(x);
local limits;
limits=zeros(7,1);
limits[1]=x[1];
limits[2]=x[2];
limits[3]=x[3]+zbarra;
limits[4]=-x[3]+zbarra;
limits[5]=x[4]+zbarra;
limits[6]=-x[4]+zbarra;
limits[7]=(alpha-x[2]-gama*x[1]+x[4]-c2)*x[2]-b2;
retp (limits);
endp;
lxix
